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Abstract: 
This paper explores the practices of one small NGO in Mindanao working innovatively to 
challenge power and interests by linking resources to local communities who control their 
productivity. While this may seem like social capital, I suggest that the agency over 
production, and the deeply political and ideological nature of the recipient communities, 
calls for a different reading. The regard for the contextual and contestational politics 
suggests that a radical alternative is emerging.  I use postdevelopment theory to frame the 
analysis of this example, posing the question: is this practice a radical alternative to the 
internationally framed global development discourses, or are we witnessing the reproduction 
of these discourses in new forms? 
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Introduction 
 
 
1. Introduction 
After fifty years of concerted effort we seem no nearer to creating a better world than when 
we started. It could be argued that the ‘development project’, based on a hegemonic idea of 
progress and informed by European Enlightenment thinking and underpinned by capitalist 
expansion, has failed. However, its resilience seems untroubled, as it continues to reinvent 
itself through the reproblematisation of poverty, its most recent self-transformation and 
renewal coming through the merging of development and security discourses (Duffield 2001, 
Novelli 2010). 
 
 
With little evidence that the development industry is weakening, a postdevelopment 
perspective provides a critique which resists merely rejecting development in favour of self- 
reliance, but seeks to reconstruct a development discourse grounded in a theoretical and 
critical perspective. This paper starts by providing a thumbnail overview of postdevelopment 
thinking before turning to the example of the Philippine based Christian NGO Malikha 
Bridge (pseudonym) to explore how their practice of networking in Muslim Mindanao might 
be conceived as an example of a postdevelopment alternative. This case-study is taken from 
my recent doctoral work where I conducted ethnographic research in Mindanao in 2009. 
   
 
 
 
To do this I draw on some of the important debates from postdevelopment literature before 
introducing the NGO Malikha Bridge, including a brief discussion of their Christian nature. I 
then introduce their practice of networking and some examples of how this has worked with 
Muslim communities in Mindanao. Having set the scene this paper then asks does the type of 
networking practiced by Malikha Bridge offers a post-development alternative?  By 
exploring how networking rethinks notions of social capital, capitalist economic expansion 
and the state as the vehicle for development I suggest that Malikha Bridge’s practice of 
networking might arguably disturb the predominant development principles underpinning 
them such as individualism, anti-politics and capitalist markets. 
 
 
2. Postdevelopment 
In his seminal book Encountering Development Escobar (1995) traces the post-war discursive 
creation of non-developed countries and growth of an authoritative industry informed by 
historical and cultural values implicit with power.  Trends within development discourse have 
changed over time, however, it remains that an internationally framed ideological project 
with technocratic solutions to “the ignorant, the residual, the inferior, the local and the non- 
productive” (Santos 2004: 239) still achieves hegemonic status. 
 
 
The evident failure of the development project has generated increasing criticism.  For its 
critics not only has it failed, with worsening income inequality and the population of many 
countries now poorer, but it is directly implicated with these outcomes, where “development 
creates and perpetuates uneven distribution of power, legitimacy, knowledge and capacity” 
(McKinnon 2004: 773). 
 
 
Critical approaches to development question its requisition of understandings of progress and 
the normative scripts that it creates. For example, Santos argues that a ‘sociology of 
absences’, produced through the promotion of Western interests through scientific knowledge 
and its associated exclusive cannon of truth,  actively discredits and trivialises alternative 
knowledges through the criteria of objective truth and efficiency.  The technocratic solution 
to the problem of poverty found in the development industry promotes progress through 
“scientific, advanced, superior, global, or productive realities” (Santos 2004: 239). Weber 
(2010), drawing on the work of Nanday (2002), critiques how poverty has been conflated 
with destitution. “By collating or collapsing these two terms, apologists of development have 
redefined all low-consuming, environment friendly lifestyles as poor and, thus degrading and 
unfit for survival in the contemporary world” (Nandy 2002: 115, cited in Weber 2010: 108). 
Using the example of micro-credit schemes Weber argues that destitution is socially and 
politically produced through globally embedded development discourses underpinned by 
neoliberal values.  Gibson-Graham (2005) argue for recognition of “diverse ecologies of 
productivity” (Gibson-Graham 2005: 6), challenging market-based definitions of ‘needy’. For 
example, in their recent work  they explore an asset based approach to development which 
recognised non-market, unpaid, and non-capitalist forms of transaction, labour and enterprise, 
such as gift giving, volunteerism, and collective endeavours. 
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While not a comprehensive list, the above scholars highlight a growing rejection of the 
development project and its underlying premises. The failure of the idea of development and 
its arguable complicity in worsening the situation of ‘the poor’ has led to Sachs’ illuminating 
conclusion that “it is not the failure of development which has to be feared, but its success” 
(Sachs 1992: 3). 
 
 
However, while a postdevelopment approach would maintain these criticisms, it would be 
erroneous to assume, therefore, that it is anti-development: 
 
 
“The challenge of postdevelopment is not to give up on development...  as 
though there were something necessarily problematic and destructive about 
deliberate attempts to increase social wellbeing through economic intervention; 
as though there were a space of purity beyond or outside development that we 
could access through renunciation. The challenge is to imagine and practice 
development differently” (Gibson-Graham 2005: 6). 
 
 
As suggested by the prefix ‘post’, a postdevelopment approach is tinged with the 
deconstructive. Rather than disregard the idea of development altogether, it instead works to 
undermine the certainty in essentialising discourses around progress. While this threatening 
of certainty may appear menacing to development technocrats looking for scalable and 
formulaic solutions, the deconstructive tendency opens up opportunities for reconstruction, so 
that “at the same time that it starts something new, it also continues something, is true to the 
memory of its past, to a heritage” (Derrida, in Derrida and Caputo 1997: 6). McKinnon 
identifies this heritage as hope, proclaiming: “development is a project of hope” (McKinnon 
2007: 772). A postdevelopment approach, therefore, is not about abandoning development, 
but imagining a different type of development which goes beyond the limitations of current 
understandings and practices. 
 
 
Postdevelopment perspectives, however, are not without their critics. Amongst the critiques is 
that the (important) problematising of Western normative scripts about development can 
sometimes result in a predilection towards grassroots movements resulting in a romantic 
framing which gives way to ethnocentrism and cultural relativism, where the critical rigour 
applied to development and the West is not afforded to the South. Also, there is frustration 
that “reflections are general and no cases are discussed” (Pieterse 2000). However, I do not 
see these significant problems as necessarily inherent to a postdevelopment perspective, and I 
hope, in what follows, to address some of these issues through the discussion of a potential 
alternative where practice is discussed. 
 
 
3. Malikha Bridge 
Malikha Bridge is a Christian NGO which at the time of my PhD field research (2009) 
worked in multiple sites in Muslim Mindanao. It works with Muslim communities with an 
objective to build on interactions of “peace, mercy, grace, love and forgiveness to make 
relationships mutually accessible between two or more localities where there is no previous 
connection” (Malikha Bridge website 2008). This very broad aim to build authentic and 
reciprocal relationships has become manifest in a number of understandings of what this 
   
 
 
 
means, including a commitment to the welfare of their Muslim friends, mutual respect of 
their culture, and listening to their perspective and experiences.  The outcome has been the 
continual development of a variety of practices from development projects, to cultural 
affirmation, to advocacy, often combined and overlapping in a series of community based 
ventures. All of their praxis is premised on the relational ethic forefronted in the above 
objective. 
 
 
The aim to build relationships, and what this might mean, is shaped by their engagement with 
their context. Malikha Bridge practice relationship building in the situation of a protracted 
low-level armed conflict between the majority Christian Government of the Philippines and a 
number of Autonomous Armed Groups (AAGs) claiming to represent the views of the 
‘Filipino’ Muslim communities (at the time of my research this conflict was on-going, at the 
time of writing a peace pact has been signed which is hoped will mark the beginning of the 
end of this conflict). The deep rooted suspicion between Muslims and Christians that has 
arisen from decades of religious conflict make the building of relationships between the two 
groups both difficult and necessary. A recent tide of aggressive Protestant evangelism 
originating from the US and incorporating Filipino Christians has further entrenched 
unhelpful attitudes between the groups. Evangelical Christians tended to view Muslims as in 
need of their ‘salvation’, reinforcing  a mainstream view of many ethnic Christians that 
characterised Muslims as untrustworthy, back-stabbing, unscrupulous in their business 
dealings, dangerous, and at best lazy. Wary Muslims were in turn defensive of the neo- 
colonising Christians who wish to impose their culture onto them. This is reminiscent of the 
three century long ‘Moro wars’ between Mindanao and Luzon-based Filipino Christian 
converts fighting on behalf of their Spanish converters/colonisers. 
 
 
The objective to build relationships makes Malikha Bridge a beautifully difficult NGO to 
categorise. Their commitment to ‘peace’ and ‘forgiveness’ affiliates them with the peace- 
building NGOs of Mindanao, while their Christian nature and the inter-faith dialogue their 
work facilitates positions them as missionaries.  Furthermore, their understanding of  peace 
and ‘Godly transformation’ informs a holistic perspective where both ‘Godly’ and ‘peace’ 
have something to do with the dignity and welfare of the person, including their right to a 
livelihood, resulting in development orientated practices and making them look like a 
development NGO. While, for the purpose of this paper, I will focus my discussion on their 
development praxis, I do not wish to erase or ignore these other facets, which would be 
impossible anyway, as they inform and connect with each other. 
 
 
 
4. Networking 
The particular practice this paper will address is the practice of networking or ‘Insider 
Movements’. I prefer networking as a description because Insider Movements already exists 
as a missionary model, and Malikha Bridge have reworked and interpreted it in such a way 
that it differs in both practice and underlying principle, making the term misleading and 
unhelpful to outside readers. 
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The reference to a bridge in the name Malikha Bridge should be put into Filipino context. In 
the partnered community in South West Mindanao, like many elsewhere in the Philippines, 
many of the houses are built over the tidal zone or over the sea, requiring narrow bamboo 
bridges to link them to the mainland and other houses. It requires real practice and skill to 
balance across these beams, and I soon discovered the consequences of not being able to 
traverse these small bamboo bridges, as I became excluded from the network of bridges that 
connected the community. Malikha Bridge make small bridges between the ethnic Muslim 
communities they work with and the relativity wealthy network of Christians they can access, 
and their much needed resources. Like balancing on bamboo poles, this requires skill and 
ability. Not being able to traverse these connections leaves you excluded. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Malikha Bridge use Insider Movement Communities (IMC) to facilitate community 
organising and networking. Partnering with volunteers from within ethnic Muslim 
communities, Malikha Bridge aid cultural and development projects. The volunteers, called 
Insiders (or collectively Insider Movement Communities), are provided with resources from 
linked Christian donors, who trust the productivity of those resources into the hands of the 
Muslim volunteers, including the values that underpin their uses. Malikha Bridge help their 
partners in an advisory role and in their access to Christian resources, to facilitate projects 
requested by the community and run by Insiders. Malikha Bridge do not run the projects 
themselves, and while they are largely resourced through their contacts and training is 
provided through them, emphasis is put on what Insiders and their community can provide 
and capacity building. How they worked is best illustrated through the following examples: 
 
 
4.1. e.g. pre-school 
The pre-school is a project run by Insiders from one Muslim community that is valued and 
used by the local Muslim community. Experience from the Muslim community was that if a 
child attended school with no pre-school education then their poor performance in relation to 
other children would relegate them to the back of the class from the start and they would be 
largely ignored for the rest of their schooling. During a ‘felt needs survey’ education was 
identified as an area of need, and Malikha Bridge was approached to help in this area. In 
   
 
 
 
addition to assisting with the building project Malikha Bridge were also able to help IMC 
think about the organizing values of the pre-school, a training approach strongly permeated 
with a sense of Conscientization (Friere 1972). They provided some basic teacher training, 
which they continue to provide as volunteers progress in their confidence. 
 
 
Pre-school vision, values and mission from Insider Movement training: 
 
 
 
 
4.2. e.g. Medical mission 
In a different community in South West Mindanao Malikha Bridge facilitated a community- 
run medical project.  Access to Filipino Christian doctors for three days were offered to the 
community, who were happy to accept the offer of help from a team of Christian doctors, but 
with the Muslim community running the mission, from managing the sites, the systems for 
patients to queue, be assessed and treated, and the dispensing of medicine in the pharmacy. 
There were also conditions on the doctors – no evangelism and respectful, modest dress 
appropriate to Islamic culture. The community were given access to the resources (medical 
personnel and drugs), but were in control of the productivity of these resources. As the 
mission was organised by the community their culture permeated its organisation in many 
subtle ways, from Islamic prayer over the mission, the importance of hospitality which 
emphasised the generous feeding of the Christian doctors, and the use of local mosques as the 
physical sites for the surgeries. Even the medical assistance required was shaped by the 
community, with circumcision being a popular procedure for many Muslims who had not 
previously had the opportunity to undertake this Islamic practice. 
 
 
4.3. e.g. Water project 
In a community in central Mindanao potable water was in short supply and this was raised 
with Malikha Bridge, who connected the community to a Masters student in hydro- 
engineering from Germany, who visited the community for several months and was able to 
design a water system and cost it as part of his course work. On one of my field visits the 
community was attempting to find the financial resources to implement the building of the 
water system through the network of donors accessed via Malikha Bridge (including the 
Masters student’s own church community). The costing of the project was only for the raw 
materials, the plan was that once they have the resources that the student would return and 
teach them how to install and maintain the system themselves. Not only did this save money, 
as the community provided all of the labour needed, but the production of the resources 
(materials and know-how) into something of value by the community (clean water) has an 
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educational and capacity building function. On a subsequent visit I met the student and 
witnessed the beginnings of the build. 
 
 
5. A postdevelopment alternative? 
Through placing the productivity of the resources in the hands of the community this practice 
appears to be fore fronting the context and local values. The role of Insiders in identifying 
their own projects, and shaping how the resources are to be used from their cultural and 
religious perspective, not only challenges donors to release conditions from any resource 
gifted, but the role of volunteerism in appropriating the resource’s value advances communal 
and non-capitalist enterprise.  Also, the network of donors (a network of Christian global and 
regional assemblages formed by transnational missionary movements that as missionaries 
themselves Malikha Bridge can access), span the Philippines, Europe, Australia, and North 
America and connect directly to the IMC, challenging the primacy of the state as the vehicle 
of development and creatively interacting with and cross-cutting political arrangements and 
emergent assemblages. 
 
 
These characteristics suggest to me that this could be interpreted as a postdevelopment 
practice, and necessitates further analysis. Using a postdevelopment approach the remainder 
of this paper will explore how these practices could be understood as an innovative 
alternative to hegemonic development discourses, in particular around three dominant 
development themes: social capital, economic (capitalist) expansion, and the role of the state. 
While I explore these themes separately they are all related. For example Putman 
understands social capital as an individual advantage and consequently civil society is valued 
as a means of individual economic advantage, while the World Bank understands 
development as the complementary relationship between social capital and the state. I have 
chosen these three themes to structure my analysis because they are relevant to the case study 
and because they are representative of how current development trends continue to frame 
development as technocratic solutions underpinned by Western values such as individualism 
and capitalist growth. 
 
 
5.1. Social Capital v Community Organising 
On the surface the networking practices of Malikha Bridge look deceptively similar to social 
capital. Social capital is a neutral term, but, similar to globalisation, has been claimed by a 
variety of causes, each imposing their own understanding on the term. All-encompassing 
participation can be interpreted as socialism, while an emphasis on ‘big society’ highlights 
the reduced role of the state and associated neo-liberal values. However, the term has been 
quite successfully claimed, for the most part, by the World Bank. 
 
 
Taking the hegemonic World Bank understanding of social capital as my starting point, social 
capital has successfully achieved a ‘magic bullet’ status within the World Bank and 
associated global development institutions, and has consequently gained much prominence in 
development theory, policy and practice. Under the World Bank, social capital has been 
hailed as the ‘missing link’ in development.  Often described as “the glue that holds society 
together” it has been promoted strongly through research agendas and literature on a World 
   
 
 
 
Bank dedicated website. The wealth of literature and research on social capital focuses on 
describing the contribution of social capital to economic development and efforts to quantify 
and measure it.  This research focus exemplifies a view of social capital “as a means both to 
understand the response to market imperfections and to correct them” (Fine 2001: 123), and 
in “deploying social capital to complement, not fundamentally to reassess, existing economic 
prognoses” (ibid: 156). 
 
 
The metaphor of a ‘missing link’ reveals a technocratic solution to the problem of 
‘underdevelopment’ which presents an apolitical account of development contexts, while the 
economic framing of the social is for individual financial gain. It is these two characteristics 
of social capital that are challenged through a type of community organising: the 
depoliticising of development and capitalist economic expansion. As I will be discussing an 
alternative aim to capitalist economic expansion in the next section I will focus this section 
on the depoliticising effect of social capital and an alternative response. 
 
 
Social capital is theoretically weak in its understanding of power and conflict. The underlying 
perspective of economics generally fails to engage in considerations of structural or cultural 
violence. For example, the World Bank Social Capital Webpage claims that “conflict is the 
struggle over scarce resources arising over competing goals between two or more parties” 
(World Bank, cited in Fine 2001: 156). While examples of more nuanced understandings of a 
contextualised social capital which consider conflict and other relevant social characteristics 
such as class survive, such as the work of Bebbington (e.g. 1997), for the World Bank 
generally a reductionist understand of the social prevails and capital is neutral. 
 
 
A technocratic solution is unable to address complex contextual conflicts and interests, and “if 
a community is riven by conflicting interests, the nature and meaning of social capital 
becomes more complicated” (Evans 1996: 1127, cited in Fine 2001: 123). Fine concludes 
form this deduction that “if conflict undermines the notion of social capital, then why not take 
conflict and its theoretical underpinnings as a starting point rather than a social capital that 
has been rendered both ambiguous and redundant?” ( Fine 2001: 123). By positioning social 
capital as the organising concept in understanding development, group membership and 
(sanctioned) civic engagement becomes the upmost requirement, in effect submerging the 
requirement for political action, thus depoliticising development. 
 
 
The appeal to the World Bank is not difficult to locate, as a distinct lack of consideration of 
context and power relations provides an easy, non-messy solution to ‘poverty’ which does 
little to challenge economic interests: 
 
“On the one hand it is self-help and co-operation raised from the individual to 
the communal level at some tier or other. On the other hand, it is the rich and 
powerful speculating on how to improve the lot of the poor through promoting 
their self-help and organisation without questioning the sources of their 
economic disadvantage”(Fine ibid: 199) . 
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Social capital has many and growing forms as it seeks to expand its scope by introducing new 
variables, e.g. vertical, horizontal, bridging, bonding,  and infers a just add and mix approach: 
insert where it is deemed lacking, and watch  economic development and good governance 
flourish. Linking capital has become the newest form of social capital: 
 
 
“Latterly, a third type of variant capital has been added: ‘linking capital’, which 
connects poor or subordinated people and, it is suggested, individuals in 
positions of power and influence... Can one be ‘against’ participation and 
empowerment? But these ideas are deceptive because they are used to veil the 
nature and the effects of power... They hold out the prospects of democracy (in 
‘civil society’) without the inconveniences of contestational politics and ideas 
and interests that are an essential part of democracy” (Harriss 2002:116/8). 
 
 
In this quote Harris not only identifies linking capital as the newest form of social capital, but 
goes on to critique it and social capital in general as working to depoliticise development. 
And this is where Malikha Bridge’s practice of community organising offers an alternative to 
a decontextualised social capital. Malikha Bridge, through focusing on the relational, far from 
decontextualising practice, engages politically and challenges structural violence apparent in 
Mindanao through a network of agents at different levels across numerous locations, 
including actors from local and political organizations.  Central to this engagement is 
Malikha Bridge’s emphasis on the recipient communities’ charge over the productivity of the 
donations (including the production of values around identity and belonging) which 
contributes to increased agency and seeks to address structural and cultural inequalities. 
 
 
In their role as small bridges Malikha Bridge acts like a vetting agency. They do not simply 
connect IMC with Christian donors, they manage the interaction of the churches and 
Christian organisations, selecting resources that come without conditions attached. In this 
sense the ethnic Muslims trust Malikha Bridge to make good links, they are willing to work 
with these Christians because Malikha Bridge have recommended them. Conversely, 
Christian organisations feel that they can trust their resources to the communities because 
Malikha Bridge can vouch for them. This fascinating position in-between allows Malikha 
Bridge to address some of the power issues at play, the wealth and power possessed by the 
Christian majority is released with a little of their power (conditions) removed, while the 
control of their own productivity is put in the hands of the IMC, a little bit of power 
redressed: where they were once excluded from this capital flow, they are now, in some small 
way, included. 
 
 
Considering the immensely political space that Malikha Bridge is operating within, any 
relinquishing/redressing of power is remarkable. Malikha Bridge work in the context of a 
religious conflict, and the IMCs they partner with come from and assist wider ethnic Muslim 
communities which include among them individuals who have previously fought against the 
Government of the Philippines (either in the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) before 
the 1996 peace accord or with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) who’s armed 
struggle against the government continued at the time of my research and has only recently 
(7.10.2012) been the subject of a peace pact). It is not possible to ignore the contestational 
   
 
 
 
politics which permeate the context where Malikha Bridge work. The agency of the recipient 
communities over the productivity of donated resources is inherently political, not only in 
increasing their agency, but also in its role in affirming their culture, and addresses a long- 
standing mistrust and condescension towards Muslim communities by many of the majority 
ethnic Christian population. 
 
 
In addition to challenging and redressing some of the structural and cultural violence against 
many ethnic Muslims in Mindanao through connecting partners with resources and 
facilitating production, Malikha Bridge also actively advocate on their behalf.  For example 
while I was there Eduardo (Malikha Bridge’s director) invited one of the IMC leaders to visit 
and talk to his class on a Masters Degree unit on Peace in Mindanao in a Catholic University 
where he taught  . Here the IMC leader shared his vision of ‘Bangsa Moro’, the term given to 
the Islamic political solution to the conflict, interpreted as Muslim Nation. 
 
 
In this exploration we find a practice that, similar to social capital, encourages community 
organising which addresses felt needs. However, the networking described here provides an 
alternative to a decontextualised and de-politicised social capital of the World Bank, 
challenging structural violence and the cultural violence which underpins it, while engaging 
in the inherently political context where it operates. 
 
 
5.2. Capitalist Economic Expansion V Community Productivity 
Economic development has always been the mainstay of the development industry. While 
trends in economics, from the demise of Keynesian economics to the rise of neo-liberalism, 
are mirrored in development economics, realizing economic growth has always been the 
means of achieving ‘progress’: 
 
 
“The discourse of development economics gave us successive promises of 
affluence for the Third World through active intervention in the economy in the 
1950s and 1960s, planning throughout the development era, stabilization and 
adjustment policies in the 1980s, and anti-interventionist “market friendly 
development” for the 1990s” (Escobar 1995: 58). 
 
 
Mindanao is known within the Philippines as ‘The Land of Promise’. Its promise lies in the 
rich natural resources such as produce, minerals, timber, and, most recently discovered 
potentially lucrative oil fields.  Rich resources are combined with the faithful adoption of 
received development wisdom, for example “market friendly development” was pursued 
while simultaneously investing in education to produce human capital. Having spent up to a 
quarter of their national budgets on education in the 1980s (Fägerlind and Saha 1989: 3) the 
Philippines enjoys a current literacy rate of 92.6% (CIA 2008). However, privately owned 
logging and mining companies have done little in real terms to help the local economy, 
providing little employment opportunities beyond a limited amount of manual labour. The 
environmental devastation caused by their activities impacts entire communities, so that not 
only do they not benefit from their activity, but they also bear the cost.  The only local money 
to be made from international logging and mining companies seems to come from the rent 
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sought by officials.  The failure of neo-liberal development in Mindanao hasn’t just been its 
inability to create the elusive trickle-down effect, but to contribute to an economy that 
actually “trickles up” (Carrol 1986, cited in Holden 2009:187). 
 
 
The communities that Malikha Bridge partner with range from the urban poor to the landless 
rural poor,  and for these communities the ‘wisdom’ of development economics has done 
little to help them, and arguably may have worsened their situation, where they were poor, 
they are now made destitute: 
 
 
“Large parts of Africa, Latin America and Asia were poor by contemporary 
standards of income and consumption before colonial administrators and 
development planners began to identify them as poor. That does not mean they 
had massive destitution or that the quality of life there was abysmally poor. 
Destitution, or at least large-scale destitution, is a more recent phenomenon.  It 
has been increasing among many traditionally poor communities over the last 
hundred years, partly as a direct result of urbanisation and development. The 
most glaring instances of destitution are found not in traditional isolated tribal 
communities, but among the poor communities that are uprooted and 
fragmented and move into cities as individuals or nuclear families.  It is also 
found among landless agricultural labourers who for some reason lose their jobs 
in a situation where agriculture is industrialised or becomes unprofitable. They 
are the ones who find themselves unable to cope with the demand of an 
impersonal market or the culture of a modern political economy” (Nandy 2002: 
115-6, cited in Weber 2010: 108). 
 
 
One consequence of a capitalist model of economic expansion, the private ownership of land, 
has had a devastating impact on the welfare of many ethnic Muslims in Mindanao. The 
Muslim populations of Mindanao considered land that they occupied as theirs to use, 
however, a land-titling system imposed on them in the late 1960s introduced a different and 
foreign understanding of land ownership which was not fully understood. As a growing 
number of Filipino Christians settled in Mindanao they claimed land occupied by the 
indigenous peoples of Mindanao as ‘untitled’, and therefore theirs.  While ethnic Muslims 
were eligible to apply for untitled land they did not understand that they had to ask the 
government for their own land.  Land ownership and control over resources remains a 
contentious issue and at the time of my research continued to fuel the armed conflict between 
the MILF and Government of the Philippines.  Many of the communities who partner with 
Malikha Bridge consist of landless agricultural labourers where seasonal work is limited and 
poorly paid (the other communities represent the urban poor). Their modest aspirations of 
substance farming are often further frustrated when they see the land unplanted. 
 
 
In this context Malikha Bridge provide an alternative to development economics tied up in 
capitalist expansion.  Their version of networking provides an alternative to capitalist 
economic/market expansion by broadening an understanding of productivity beyond the 
production of commodities for the market. In changing capitalist productive forces the social 
relations of production are also transformed so that the lived experiences of everyday life and 
the material wellbeing of the community are enhanced. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
All of the projects operated through community organising, and within the recipient 
communities there was a strong ethos of volunteerism. This is characterised by one pre- 
school teacher, Minah, who as an unemployed qualified teacher volunteered and worked at a 
community led pre-school for several years, however she had since left the community and 
lived over an hour’s journey from the pre-school, yet still took it upon herself to make the trip 
Monday to Friday to volunteer, even to the point of taking on the cost of the transportation 
herself. This was while studying for a Masters degree in the evenings. This was not an 
isolated example, in every community I visited members volunteered at a high level of 
commitment, on top of etching out a living for themselves. In South West Mindanao one 
community even formalised the volunteer movement into the ‘Piyagdayaw Team’ with ‘core’ 
volunteers sporting blue bibs, and it wasn’t just educated community members, everyone was 
valued. While Minah was a qualified teacher, another volunteer, Tanisha, was not, yet she 
volunteered not only her time but her house, to run a pre-school for the children in her 
community, taking on the role as both teacher in the pre-school and as student in her own 
non-formal training to learn the role of a learning supporter. 
 
 
Community was an important aspect of volunteerism, both in terms of consolidating ties to 
your community by investing in it, but also in how communities of volunteers were 
established. The role of community and the sense of belonging was very apparent, where 
individuals belonged to a community, and a strong sense of identity and kinship, as a Muslim, 
as a Maguindanaon, as a Tasug, as a member of this barangay, was added to: as a pre-school 
teacher, a farmer, a builder (of water a water tower, pre-school building, etc.), a volunteer. 
Identity and belonging revealed in the act of production, especially apparent in unwaged 
work, was not just confined to the act of production either, but also manifest in what was 
produced. 
 
 
A commitment to communal enterprise and volunteerism suggests that their idea of 
development doesn’t exactly map onto the hegemonic discourses of development economics. 
There are areas of overlap and similarities, however there are subtle nuances too. By 
searching for an alternative to capitalist understandings of productivity the economics of 
labour exchange and resource management are displaced and issues around equality, 
community, agency and relationships are advanced. 
 
 
There is no doubting the economic benefit of both resources and production, and the 
economic gains it brings to the community should not be under-estimated. There was an 
important and recognised economic value in productivity which was not taken lightly, the 
majority population of the recipient communities lived at a level of poverty which kept this a 
very real and present concern. However, the direct economic gains should not be emphasized 
to the extent that they shadow out other benefits to livelihood, such as the production of 
moral and cultural values and identity. 
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In this example of a postdevelopment reading of Malikha Bridge’s work I am drawn to the 
conclusion that what I have explored above could best be described as relating to livelihoods. 
For the recipient communities, rather than a concern about capitalist economic expansion, 
they are concerned about their livelihoods: 
 
 
“Livelihood is never just a matter of finding or making shelter, transacting 
money, and preparing food to put on the table or exchange in the market place. 
It is equally a matter of the ownership and circulation of information, the 
management of relationships, the affirmation of personal significance and group 
identity, and the interrelation of each of those tasks to the other.” (Wallam. S. 
1984: 22-23) 
 
 
5.3. The Nation State V Strategic Complexes 
Development discourse has, from its inception, considered it the task of the national 
government to develop a country. The nation-state has been seen both as the vehicle for 
development and the measurement for success, and consequently state-building has been 
viewed as an important element of the development processes, to the effect that it has, 
arguably, become impossible to distinguish between development and state-building: 
 
 
“The “development” apparatus in Lesotho is not a machine for eliminating 
poverty that is incidentally involved with the state bureaucracy; it is the 
machine for reinforcing and expanding the exercise of bureaucratic state power, 
which incidentally takes “poverty” as its point of entry”… The “instrument 
effect,” then, is two-fold: alongside the institutional effect of expanding 
bureaucratic state power is the ideological effect of depoliticising both poverty 
and the state… If the “instrument-effects” of a “development” project end up 
forming any kind of strategically coherent of intelligible whole, that is it: the 
anti-politics machine” (Ferguson 1994: 255-256). 
 
 
A commitment to the political utility of the nation state continues to captivate development 
theorists and policy makers, even in the contemporary context of increasing roles for regional 
and global actors that inform an emerging concept of transnational governmentality. 
 
 
Policy makers and most international political theorists and analysts see little or 
no contradiction between an effort to consolidate neoliberal development 
strategies at the global level and the continued framing, and measuring, of 
development in terms of the nation state. (Berger and Weber 2009: 3). 
 
 
The persistence of the importance of the nation-state and the associated commitment to nation 
building, far from declining in light of emerging assemblages of networked governmentality, 
have strengthened their grip, as the mergence of development and security discourses 
promote a liberal peace agenda with state-building at its core, with the solutions to 
‘failing states’ found in the consolidating of nation-building and state-building approaches. 
 
 
However, in Muslim Mindanao, the armed conflict is seen by many as a liberation struggle 
from the Philippine state, which is considered to have no legitimate claim over Mindanao and 
therefore is a colonial occupier. Instead of becoming the vehicle for development the state 
   
 
 
 
can be perceived by Muslim populations in Mindanao as an obstacle to their freedom and 
progress. Furthermore, the agreement of “red lines” which create quasi no-go-areas for 
military personnel creates areas of Mindanao where the state has little reach. In contemporary 
development discourses this ethnic cleavage is seen as a threat to the nationstate and therefore 
a problem to development, with the persistence of traditional customs and attitudes a 
symptom of development’s failure, whose task is the “fundamental transformation of society, 
including a change in “preferences” and attitudes, an acceptance of change and an 
abandonment of many traditional ways of thinking” (Stiglitz 1998: 49). The emphasis on 
nation-building and a ‘modernisation’ agenda which creates the abandonment of traditional 
knowledge fails to take into account the complex context of Mindanao. For many in Muslim 
Mindanao the Philippine nation is inseparable from a Spanish and then American colonial 
ambition intrinsically linked to Christianisation. Many of the educated Christian Filipino 
populations of Luzon and the Visayas have assimilated to Western tastes in music and 
fashion, reproduced a legal system and constitution based on their American colonisers and 
embraced European Enlightenment thinking, including perceived development wisdom ( 
adapted and modified somewhat to make it feel more Filipino). This has resulted in many 
Muslims in Mindanao seeing a call for the “abandonment of traditional ways of thinking” as 
a threat to Islamic knowledge and culture, while the “change in “preference” and attitudes” is 
heard as the adoption of Christian culture.  In this context nation-building is interpreted as 
Christianisation, and the eradication of ethnic diversity. 
 
 
Through networking Malikha Bridge work around the state and link up donors and recipient 
communities independently, who interact with each other directly. Through a myriad of 
different networks and enabled by the internet and social networking sites Malikha Bridge 
connect local communities in Mindanao with regional and global flows of resources and 
information.  The ‘grass-roots’ character of the IMCs then navigate and negotiate these 
national, regional and global linkages and flows, accessing resources from Germany 
(knowledge and capital to build a water tower), to Canada (capital to build a public toilet), to 
Manila, the Philippines (Human resources and medicines to run a medical mission). 
 
 
The networking approach goes beyond a simplistic understanding of the global, national and 
local characterised in notions of verticality and encompassment, challenging traditional 
conceptions of state spatialization. As Ferguson and Gupta explore in their ethnography of 
neo-liberal governmentality, many grassroots organisations “trump the national ace with 
appeals to “world opinion” and e-mail links to the international headquarters of such 
formidably encompassing agents of surveillance as Amnesty International... the state has no 
automatic right to success in claiming the vertical heights of sovereignty” (Ferguson and 
Gupta 2002: 989). Furthermore, the encompassment of localities within the state, and, in 
turn, the state within a series of increasing circles, is challenged by the acknowledgement that 
the ‘local’ overlap and intersect with a range of transnational domains, as Ferguson points out 
“local voluntary organisations in Africa, so beloved by civil society theorists, very often, on 
inspection, turn out to be integrally linked with national and transnational level entities” (ibid 
: 993). 
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Mindanao is no exception to the changing nature of state and global governance. The so 
called grassroots and local communities so often characterised as ‘civil society’ in much 
contemporary development literature exist in emergent global and regional assemblages that 
are  messy  and   cut   across   each   other  with   multiple  and   simultaneous   connections 
characteristic of a rhizome (Delueze and Guattari 2004). Within Mindanao the protracted 
armed conflict shares the characteristics of what Duffield would call a network war (Duffield 
2001) with regional and global dimensions. The Muslim AAGs are not isolated in their 
struggle, but are ideologically linked to the idea of the Islamic Nation. In the early days of 
their formation senior MNLF recruits were trained in Libya, Syria, Egypt or Palestine 
Liberation Organisation (PLO) camps, and Qadhafi, the then leader of Libya, was a strong 
supporter of the Muslim struggle in Mindanao, providing military and financial aid and 
advocating on their behalf at international Muslim conferences (Yegar 2002). The threat of an 
oil embargo on the Philippines resulted in the creation of the Tripoli agreement, signed on 
23
rd   
Dec  1976,  which  would  become  the  foundation  of  subsequent  peace  talks  and 
memorandums, and which many Muslims still feel has not been honoured fully to this day 
(ibid). Today the Muslim AAGs continue their tradition of nurturing international links, 
although to a lesser extent, with loose affiliation with Indonesian-based Jamaah Islamiyah 
and tenuous reported Al-Qaida links to the Abu Sayyaf group. While the Muslim AAGs of 
Mindanao call for self determination in the political solution of Bangsa Moro, the simplistic 
notion that this is organised from below, and is somehow a grassroots movement, fails to 
acknowledge the complexities and nuances involved, which include appeals to the 
international community to end discrimination and assistance from Islamic governments 
worldwide and transnational organisations such as the Islamic Summit and Conference of 
Muslim Foreign Ministers.   The international characteristic of the conflict is, similarly, 
mirrored by the Philippine Government, which enjoys the support of US military aid. On the 
back of 9/11, Gloria Macapagal-Arroya, the then President of the Philippines, secured 
US$92.2 million in military aid and loans (Cotton 2003) and went on to launch a full scale 
military offensive to pursue ‘criminal elements’ in MILF controlled territories. 
 
 
Non-military movements also share these characteristics, with much development assistance 
to grassroot communities provided by international organisations such as the Catholic 
Overseas Development Agency (CAFOD), ChristianAid, UNICEF, OXFAM, USAID, etc., 
and many more small scale development projects sponsoring their own interventions 
dominated by US church groups and their Filipino heirs. 
 
 
Instead of simplistic understandings of vertical encompassment between localities, states, and 
the global, a much messier and nuanced picture appears of emergent assemblages which cut 
across political arrangements, engaging and interrupting a series of intersects, to create 
strategic complexes (Duffield 2001). 
 
 
The recognition and appropriation of global networks to their advantage has increased the 
agency of the recipient communities partnered with Malikha Bridge. The messy, multiple, 
uncontained, and unbound nature of a network represents an instable formation of power, 
   
 
 
 
enabling social transformation as different actors traverse and occupy the new assemblages. 
The recipient communities that partner with Malikha Bridge are becoming more confident at 
traversing and playing the different flows from within these networks to their advantage. The 
outcome has been that they have the confidence to refuse assistance tied to conditions, 
repelling cultural imposition and advancing their own culture and knowledge.  The 
communities are no longer ‘needy’ and in a position of relative helplessness that necessitates 
they accept all assistance regardless of the impact, but now chooses who they allow to work 
in their communities, and what the outcomes are. For example I witnessed one IMC leader 
confidently and firmly instruct a conservative Christian missionary that his small 
development project must either drop its condition of Christian discipleship classes or leave 
the community. The same leader told me how he was approached by USAID to partner with 
the community’s pre-school project, however they wanted him to match the money they 
donated and  as half of their money had to go on signage promoting USAID he graciously 
declined the offer. On another occasion he wrote to a donor church in Europe accusing them 
of trying to colonise him with their ideas. 
 
 
6. Or Old determinants taking root? 
Witnessing the work of Malikha Bridge left me both excited and concerned. The 
juxtaposition of these emotions came from both simultaneously seeing the potential for a 
radical alternative to development, and seeing the pitfalls of their approach. 
 
 
The similarities between social capital and the reinterpretation of a missionary model can 
equally serve to consolidate them as to unsettle them. It is very difficult in the moment to 
know if you are witnessing the emergence of something new or the reproduction of old 
discourses in a new form. 
 
 
The networking approach used by Malikha Bridge does have some significant drawbacks. 
While it does challenge power relations to a degree, it still relies on the altruistic whims of 
others (donor communities), and currently has not permanently or comprehensively changed 
the power structures at play. It may improve the lot of the communities it works in, but the 
effect it has to produce change more widely is untested. Furthermore, the reliance on 
volunteer communities only works because of widespread unemployment and inequality. One 
has to question the wisdom of championing a model that works precisely because of the 
destitution it is supposed to oppose. The IMCs are able to work for their communities 
precisely because they are out of work. Minah is a qualified teacher working towards her 
master’s degree, but who cannot find employment and so is working for free. Is this a noble 
solution or gross injustice? The non-financial rewards of communal enterprise are important, 
and at present are undervalued, however my case is not to address this by underestimating the 
need for financial security as well, instead I would advocate a mixed economy. It may be 
very well to extol the non-financial virtues of livelihood, however it does help if at least one 
member of your household has a job in the formal economy. This was understood by my 
participants, who for many the only opportunity for this was to send the women of the house 
to the Middle East as an overseas worker. One IMC only survives because of the income 
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provided by the wife of the IMC leader who works as a domestic help in Lebanon to support 
her husband to work fulltime for the IMC (and also enables him to provide financial 
assistance to individuals in need within the community in the form of small gifts, as is 
culturally expected from a community leader). 
 
 
However, while these are important questions, postdevelopment approaches are about hope, 
not certainty. The manifest ‘post’ of postdevelopment bears witness to an approach framed by 
uncertainty and contingency. Just as “in poststructuralism all knowledge is inseparable from 
the uncertain shifting language through which we come to know and express that knowing… 
postdevelopment work deals directly with the fundamental uncertainty that must pervade 
scholarly work as well as the practice of development” (McKinnin 2007: 773). In this, while 
situated in the hard realities of destitute and poor communities, a postdevelopment approach 
accepts the impossibility of an unproblematic idea of development, precisely because the 
indeterminate and provisional contain the potential for the emergence of something radical. 
While it is impossible to know if in Malikha Bridge’s practice of networking we are 
witnessing the emergence of something new or merely old determinants taking root, a 
postdevelopment approach orientates itself around the hope which it creates and the potential 
of the emergence of an alternative. 
 
 
Hope should not be mistaken as something abstract or nebulous, but as Rima Dali, a Syrian 
activist reminds us: “Hope is not something abstract for us. When we help each other there’s 
hope, when we try to open dialogue, bridges with other people who have different views, we 
look for hope – day in, day out” (Newsnight 14th April 2012).   Hope, therefore is something 
created, and the role of creating is evident in Malikha Bridge’s name.  According to the 
Malikha Bridge website the creation of connections is likened to the Tagalog word create: 
 
 
‘Malikha’ is from the Tagalog root word ‘likha’ meaning ‘create’. The prefix 
‘ma’ denotes an ability to create. What makes the Tagalog term different from 
its English translation is the dynamic process of an ability to create in the 
present. In short, it assumes ‘doing’ and to retain the identity the ‘doing’ is 
ongoing (Malikha Bridge website 2008). 
 
 
The image invoked of the making, remaking and on-going making of small bridges conjured 
here speaks to the uncertain hope found in a postdevelopment approach. The hope of new and 
peaceful relationships, in dignity, is not a distant dream but made in the here and now. And 
yet the ongoing nature of the creation suggests indeterminacy, allowing for improved 
creations to occur, revealing the unfixed nature of the creation. There is a strong sense of 
utopia in this description, that we can will-fully imagine and create a different future in the 
present. For Bloch (1986) the future consists of real possibilities and the utopian function is 
to affect the future so as to realise those possibilities. The link between the ‘likha’ and the 
‘ma’, suggests this participation, while the ongoing nature points to the Not Yet and its open- 
endedness. The marriage of the present and the ongoing, and their seemingly paradoxical 
synchronicity, found in Malikha Bridge’s description of the word malikha, seems consistent 
with Bloch’s idea of an opened-ended utopia orientated around the Not Yet. For further 
reading on the utopian element of Malikha Bridge’s work see Horner 2013. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
I feel that I have to draw a conclusion on my question: [is this] a postdevelopment alternative 
in Mindanao? Although I maintain that it is impossible to know at the time if one is 
witnessing the emergence of something radical or merely innovative reproductions of old 
discourses, I will conclude that I want to believe that this is a postdevelopment  alternative. 
 
 
The networking praxis facilitated by Malikha Bridge addresses many of the critiques on the 
development project sketched in the opening paragraphs of this paper: 
 
 
It replaces the hierarchical technocratic development experts with a horizontal network of 
nodes and connections, and with its emphasis on partnership instead of intervention seeks to 
disturb ideas of empowerment understanding that “the will to empower others hinges upon 
positioning oneself as expert with the power to diagnose and correct a deficit of power in 
someone else... Empowerment is still, in short, a relationship of power” (Murray Li 2007: 
275). Through removing donor (and Christian) conditions from the resources and by 
responding to the requests of communities rather than imposing their own development 
agendas onto them Malikha Bridge seem to be facilitating genuine community agency. 
Spend time with Malikha Bridge and the IMCs and it becomes hard to sketch a picture of the 
Muslim communities of Mindanao as inferior, residual, non-productive and ignorant 
localities. 
 
 
It does not de-politicise the development process, but tackles questions of interests and power 
straight on. Through vetting resources and donors Malikha Bridge directly address issues 
around conditionality and place the productivity of the resources directly into the hands of the 
Muslim communities. Furthermore the training Malikha Bridge facilitates permeates with the 
understanding of Conscientization, encouraging a critical consciousness.  They also use their 
connections to advocate on behalf of Muslim communities, and share their stories to increase 
awareness of their situations, but also where possible sharing the opportunities so that ethnic 
Muslims can themselves share their experiences directly, for example facilitating an IMC 
leader sharing his idea of a political solution to the conflict at a Catholic college. 
 
 
It reduces dependency through capacity building. There are short falls that need to be 
acknowledged. I am not sure if the networking would succeed without Malikha Bridge, and 
my concern is that when Malikha Bridge leave the communities will be left once again 
isolated from these new found connections. In this sense the networking practice may also 
increase dependency (on Malikha Bridge), and be found to be unsustainable. However, these 
issues do not seem to be lost on Malikha Bridge, who have a long term goal that once a 
connection has been made the communities will have the confidence to approach that 
connection directly for future requests, thus removing Malikha Bridge from the equation. I 
am also interested in the potential for the communities to start to forge their own links outside 
of Malikha Bridge’s network. While the capacity building focuses on, for example, the 
maintenance of the water system, the IMC are also developing their skills in traversing and 
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negotiating different international networks. The wife of the IMC leader who worked as a 
domestic help in Lebanon and sent money home to support the IMC poses an interesting 
question: When she was in Lebanon was she part of the international network? This may be 
an example of how the IMCs could start to use other global networks. The Philippines 
already has well established and active overseas workers associations, some of which are 
involved in community development projects, and now an IMC leader’s wife has a 
completely new network of contacts in the Lebanon. To my knowledge this potential has not 
been developed yet, and my fear is that the communities may be relying too heavily on 
Malikha Bridge. Some may also feel an unnecessarily and unsolicited gratitude towards 
Malikha Bridge which may hold them back from pursuing other avenues. However, Bloch 
would argue that possibilities exist as part of reality even if they are not realized, and the 
possibility to reduce dependency through multiple networks is contained within this praxis. 
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